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The Rise and Fall of Fear of Abuse in Consumer
Bankruptcy: Most Recent Comparative Evidence
from Europe and Beyond
Jason J. Kilborn*
Abstract: Prepared for a symposium celebrating the groundbreaking
career of Jay Westbrook, this Article examines recent evidence of fear of
abuse of the benefits of consumer bankruptcy and the gradual abatement of
that fear in modern consumer insolvency law reform. It marshals evidence
of a recent and accelerating retreat in both the judicial discretion that
Westbrook attributed to lawmakers’ fear of abuse and other more direct
techniques to avoid abusive recourse to consumer discharge. Fear of abuse
appears to be diminishing with accumulated experience as indicated by
recent liberalizing reforms in Denmark, Slovakia, Poland, Austria, Russia,
and Romania. At the same time, evidence from countries that have only begun
to develop policies on personal insolvency and discharge—Croatia,
Bulgaria, China, and Saudi Arabia—indicate that fear, or at least resistance
to discharge relief, clearly persists.
Law is fundamentally a social science. Its theories usually can and
should be tested based not just on the behavior of appellate courts but also on
anthropological evidence of the actual frontline form and effect of law s
regulation of human behavior. Jay Westbrook has led the charge in an
enormously fruitful campaign of discovery of such evidence in the United
States.1 Our federalist legal system offers a natural laboratory for comparison
of different approaches and outcomes in a checkerboard of state and federal
districts and their various actors often widely divergent approaches to key
issues. This is surprisingly true even in the supposedly unified federal
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School (Chicago) and Van der Grinten Professor of
International & Comparative Insolvency Law, Business & Law Research Centre, Radboud
University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands), jkilborn@jmls.edu.
1. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS
WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 17 20 (1989)
in ten federal judicial districts across the United States); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH
WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 7
11 (2000) (discussing Phase II of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, which focused on debtors in
sixteen federal districts); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981–1991,
68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 122 24 (1994) (same).
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consumer bankruptcy system. Opportunities for comparative analysis are
supercharged, however, when one moves outside the United States and
beyond the Anglo-American context on which most consumer bankruptcy
scholarship has focused.
Almost exactly twenty years ago, Jay extrapolated his research on U.S.
consumer bankruptcy to the new frontier of emerging consumer insolvency
systems in Europe. In so doing, he launched a field of scholarship that would
yield rich rewards. Before the turn of the twenty-first century, there was all
but nothing in Europe to compare with Anglo-American consumer
bankruptcy practice.2 By the late 1990s, however, the first consumer
discharge procedures were emerging in Northern Europe and had produced a
foundation of operational results for comparison. Jay was among the first
Americans to seize this new opportunity.
In a short commentary on one of the earliest comparative consumer
bankruptcy conferences in Europe, Jay noted the potential of comparative
perspectives on the topic.3 At that time, he was studying judicial discretion
and a resulting pernicious phenomenon that he referred to as local legal
culture, marked by persistent disparate treatment of similarly situated
consumer debtors across the United States.4 The comparative conference
offered Jay a chance to extrapolate his U.S. findings to the few emerging
consumer discharge regimes in Europe and to develop hypotheses as to the
causes of the phenomenon of local legal culture. He noted that even the sparse
European data revealed the emergence of local legal culture as a consequence
of judicial discretion, particularly in determining (1) whether certain debtors
should have access to a discharge and (2) the duration of the payment plan
imposed on debtors as a quid pro quo for earning discharge relief.5
In light of his U.S. research, augmented by this limited set of
comparative observations, Jay tentatively suggested a cause for the discretion
producing these local legal culture disparities on both sides of the Atlantic:
he attributed this syndrome to a powerful fear of abuse by debtors of the
benefit of consumer discharge relief, a benefit that was radical and
revolutionary in Europe and still somewhat controversial in the United

2. When U.S. reformers were looking for comparative ideas for revision of the U.S. bankruptcy
law in the 1
COMM N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 66 (1973).
3. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Local Legal Culture and the Fear of Abuse, 6 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 25, 33 34 (1998).
4. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL Y 801, 803 07 (1994) (applying the concept of local legal culture to bankruptcy law);
Westbrook, supra note 3, at 26 27 (elaborating upon the concept of local legal culture).
5. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 25, 32 33.
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States.6 He optimistically predicted [f]urther research over the next several
years in the various countries that have adopted these new laws could yield a
rich harvest of new evidence and perhaps unexpected variations. 7
This commentary was published just as I was beginning my academic
career, and it inspired everything I have done since then. It is extremely
gratifying to be able to celebrate Jay s career in this symposium issue by
adducing recent comparative evidence in support of his thesis in that early
commentary and by providing a small taste of the rich harvest of new
evidence 8 from the most recent developments in consumer bankruptcy in
Europe and beyond. As Jay predicted, European authorities have been
extremely concerned about debtors abusing the new discharge regimes, and
common impediments to relief have been far more obvious and imposing
than the nuanced effects of discretion and the resulting local legal culture.
Twenty years after Jay identified this fear of abuse, however, a thaw is
manifest in the icy European attitude, as evidenced in particular by
developments over just the past few months. Fear of abuse and
discretionary or statutory mechanisms for making the path to discharge
narrower and more onerous appears to be diminishing with time and
experience. This message needs to be broadcast more effectively, as several
projects for new consumer discharge laws reveal a resurgence of fear of abuse
or at least reticence to embrace the notion of discharge relief. Thus, the
vicious cycle repeats itself.
This Article presents the most recent evidence of these propositions in
three segments. Part I discusses three regimes that exemplify the trends
discussed above that is, extremely fearful, highly discretionary procedures
that abruptly reversed course on fear of abuse after a decade or two of
operation but retained significant court discretion (Denmark, Slovakia,
Poland). Part II announces some of the most recent developments, including
notable harbingers of both a softening of fear of abuse and a reining-in of
discretion across Europe (Austria, Russia, Croatia, Romania). Part III looks
to the future of several nascent personal insolvency regimes-in-waiting,
which evidence a return to square one and a high degree of fear or resistance
to discharge (Bulgaria, China, Saudi Arabia). Like Jay s commentary, mine
here is designed primarily to stimulate interest in and discussions of
developments of which many followers of English-language legal
scholarship will be unaware9 but which hold great potential for revealing

6. Id. at 28.
7. Id. at 33 34.
8. Id. at 34.
9. See id. at 25
referring the reader to a very interesting series of papers about consumer bankruptcy that many will
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important cross-cultural trends about this important area of legal and social
policy.
I.

From Fear and Discretion to Acceptance and Greater Standardization

A.

Denmark 1984–2005

The first story is a bit dated, but it is both closely connected to Jay s
early foray into comparative consumer bankruptcy and perfectly revealing of
the trend away from the discretion and fear he described. Denmark was the
bellwether, adopting the very first consumer debt adjustment 10 law in
Europe in 1984.11 The Danish law was structured very much like the
Norwegian law that caught Jay s interest,12 as a persistent problem of local
legal culture plagued Danish practice for two decades and led to the only
major reform of this law in 2005. This syndrome of local legal culture
resulting from judicial discretion was fairly clearly born of a powerful fear
of abuse of this radical departure from the traditional pacta sunt servanda
notion that debts must be paid. Trailblazing Danish lawmakers were
expressly hesitant to undermine individual-payment morality, so they
imposed strict, discretionary access controls at both the entry and exit points
to discharge relief.
Simply to gain access to the relief process, debtors had to clear two
hurdles. First, they had to exhibit qualified insolvency, which implied a
clear and doubt-free inability to regain financial footing in the foreseeable
future, by reducing profligate living standards and redoubling efforts to
service debts in full.13 Second, as in Norway,14 each court had to be convinced
that offering relief in any particular case was subjectively appropriate in light
of a series of enumerated factors, such as the debtor s efforts to manage debt
problems and the makeup of the debt load (preferably relatively few fines,
penalties, and irresponsible debts, such as debts for luxury consumption).15
Predictably, the highly subjective and probing inquiries prompted by these
two tests produced widely and persistently divergent results among debtors
10. This is the usual language used to name these laws in continental Europe, eschewing both
11. Lov nr. 187 af 09.05.1984 om gældssaneringslov [Law No. 187 of 9 May 1984 on consumer
debt adjustment], af konkurslov afsnit IV, kapitel 25 29 [at Bankruptcy Act Section IV, Chapters
25 29] (Den.) [hereinafter Konkurslov].
12. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 32 33 (discussing the discretionary elements of Norwegian
bankruptcy law, which produced local variations similar to those observed in the United States).
13. Konkurslov, supra note 11, § 197.
14. See Westbrook, supra
15. Jason J. Kilborn, Twenty-Five Years of Consumer Bankruptcy in Continental Europe: Internalizing Negative Externalities and Humanizing Justice in Denmark, 18 INT L INSOLVENCY REV.
155, 168 (2009).
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based on little more than the location of the governing court. In 2002, for
example, while the court in Odense admitted approximately 66% of its 161
debt adjustment applications, the court in Roskilde admitted only 39% of its
139 applicants, and the court in Copenhagen admitted a mere 25% of [its]
828 applications. 16 For debtors who navigated past this Scylla, the
Charybdis of court confirmation of debtors five-year debt adjustment plans
presented an equally daunting and equally divergent challenge. While the
court in Århus closed 41% of its 244 cases with a confirmed plan, the courts
in Ålborg and Randers confirmed plans in only 19% and 15%, respectively,
of the 136 cases closed by each of these courts, and [a]s in most years, the
Copenhagen court had a miserly success rate of only 13% of its 8,689 closed
cases. 17
For the few lucky debtors who cleared these two procedural hurdles,
more local legal cultural variation plagued their pursuit of earned relief. Like
the Norwegian law that Jay learned about,18 the Danish law also left
completely to court discretion the terms of debtors payment plans to earn
their discharge both the length in years and the budget allocated to debtors
for family support.19 Unlike in Norway, the Danish courts quickly coalesced
around a standard five-year term, but courts differed widely in their
assessment of proper budgets to support, as the statute directed, a modest
lifestyle. Some courts allowed supplementary budget items beyond a basic
allowance (for things like eye and dental care and household appliance
rental), while others did not.20 Even the amount of the basic budget allowance
varied widely and was not based on variances in local cost of living, as this
allocation varied by 40% 50% among otherwise similar districts.21 These
varying perspectives on appropriate sacrifice and thrift led some debt
counselors to suggest that their pre-bankruptcy clients engage in in-country
bankruptcy tourism, moving what we would now call their center of main

16. Id. at 174 75.
17. Id. at 175.
18. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 33
payment plans).
19. See Kilborn, supra note 15, at 172, 177 (stating that Danish law originally left questions of
-by-case and court-by20. Kilborn, supra note 15, at 177.
21. See Betænkning nr. 1449 af august 2004 om gældssanering [Report No. 1449 of August
2004 on Debt Settlement] 144 (Den.) (reporting that in 1997 1998, budget allowances for singles
varied from 2,500 kr. to 3,500 kr. and for couples from 4,000 kr. to 6,000 kr.);
Dommerfuldmægtigforeningen & Advokatrådet, Redegørelse Vedrørende Ændringer i
Konkurslovens Bestemmelser om Gældssanering [Statement Regarding Changes to the Bankruptcy
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interest (i.e., their home residence) from a miserly region to a more generous
(reasonable?) region.22
After nearly twenty years of frustration with these overly restrictive and
divergent court demands, the Danish government stepped back from fear of
abuse and launched a reform process that culminated in 2005. While the
reform did not deal directly with the regional variations in admission and plan
confirmation rates, it relaxed access criteria and standardized plan terms.
In a technical but crucial about-face, the initial presumption of restricted
access was reversed. That is, while debtors were originally presumed not
admissible unless the court was convinced that the totality of the
circumstances militated in favor of relief, after 2005 the presumption is in
favor of admission unless consideration of a slightly reformulated list of
factors suggests decisively against relief.23 Also, at least for former smallbusiness entrepreneurs, the qualified insolvency test was modified
expressly to provide admission for debtors whose economic situation is
unclear, 24 and the payment term for a discharge plan for these former smallbusiness entrepreneurs was set by Justice Ministry regulation at three years,
rather than the standard five years for consumers.25
For all debtors, the reform dealt head-on with the local legal cultural
problem of vast differences in court parsimony in discharge plans. The
Justice Ministry was tasked with establishing uniform, nationwide basic
budgetary allowances, and the Ministry took a much more humane approach
to debtor support. The new budget guidelines exceeded the upper range then
applied by the courts in most debt adjustment cases by nearly 20%, and
additional types of income were exempted entirely from distribution to
creditors, such as state transfer payments for children.26
As Jay predicted, however, local legal culture is quite sticky. The Danish
courts have continued their rigorous watch at the gates into and out of the
discharge procedure. In the decade following the reform, fewer than half of
all petitions for admission to the personal discharge procedure were granted
(fewer than 40% in 2009 and 2010).27 While the reasons for these rejections
are not reported, anecdotes from other jurisdictions suggest that most of the

22. Kilborn, supra note 15, at 174.
23. Konkurslov, supra note 11, §§ 197(4), 231a(4).
24. Id. §§ 231b, 236a(2).
25. Bekendtgørelse nr. 894 af 22.9.2005 om gældssanering [Executive Order No. 894 of
22 September 2005 on Debt Settlement] § 2 (Den.).
26. Kilborn, supra note 15 at 1, 176 78.
27. See DANMARKS DOMSTOLE, STATISTIK FOR SKIFTESAGER M.V.: MODTAGNE SAGER OM
INSOLVENSSKIFTE M.V., http://www.domstol.dk/om/talogfakta/statistik/Documents/Skiftesager/
[https://perma.cc/F6HX-JUNN] (reporting the number of debt adjustment applications received and
the number of debt adjustment applications declined). Calculations were based on ten years of data
from 2006 to 2016 (on file with author).
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rejected applications involve paperwork errors rather than merit-based
judgments. Of an average of just over 5,000 cases closed per year during this
period, only about 30% (an average of about 1,680) concluded with an
approved plan. Though again looking on the bright side, excluding the cases
rejected at the entryway, this represents a 70% confirmation rate for admitted
cases.28
B.

Slovakia 2006–2017
When Jay attended the comparative conference in 1997, Denmark s
personal discharge regime and similar ones in neighboring Scandinavia were
effectively the only games in town.29 Since then, the dam has broken and new
consumer discharge laws and experience have flooded into virtually every
country in Europe,30 often through multiple iterations and amendments of
new laws.31 Much of the intervening experience has been analyzed
elsewhere,32 so this paper will focus on the very latest developments.
The most exciting and bold departure from a system historically both
quite discretionary and quite fearful of abuse occurred in Slovakia, whose
consumer discharge system was entirely overhauled effective March 1,
2017.33 This amendment was preceded by a long period of disappointment
with the original quite restrictive law. The Slovak consumer discharge
provisions were added to the Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring 2005
with a delayed effective date of January 1, 2006.34

28. Kilborn, supra note 15, at 173.
29. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 31. Though Jay notes emerging systems in France and
Germany as well, in 1997 the French law offered no discharge to consumers and the German
consumer bankruptcy reforms would not become effective until 1999. See JASON J. KILBORN,
EXPERT RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES FOR THE
TREATMENT OF OVERINDEBTEDNESS, 1984 2010, at 13 n.69, 14 (2011).
30. But see discussion infra
debt discharge procedures).
31. See, e.g., GERARD MCCORMACK ET AL., STUDY ON A NEW APPROACH TO BUSINESS
FAILURE AND INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE MEMBER STATES
RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND PRACTICES 333 48 (2016) (reviewing the variations among consumer
discharge laws in EU member states).
32. See generally, e.g., KILBORN, supra note 29 (tracing the evolution of consumer bankruptcy
systems throughout Europe); WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY OF
NATURAL PERSONS (2013) (discussing laws of insolvency of natural persons throughout the world).
33. See Radovan Pala & Michal Michalek, Long-Awaited Changes to Restructuring Rules in
Slovakia, TAYLOR WESSING LLP (Feb. 1, 2017), https://united-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/en
/insights/rcr-update/long-awaited-changes-to-restructuring-rules-in-slovakia [https://perma
.cc/FH6E-G8DF] (discussing the enactment of an amendment to Sl
34.
zákonov z 9. decembra 2004 [Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring and on Amendment and
Supplementation of Several Other Laws of 9 December 2004] (Slovk.), http://ec.europa.eu/internal
_market/finances/docs/actionplan/transposition/slovakia/d7.3-ml-sk.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN5BVXKB].
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A surprisingly imposing barrier to relief prevented all but a few cases
from making their way past the admissions stage for the first decade of this
new law. To access relief, debtors had to pay the equivalent of about $800
liquidate that would produce the equivalent of about $2,
,659.70) in
distributions for creditors.35 Debtors who cleared this hurdle faced yet
another: like most European consumer insolvency laws, the Slovak regime
required debtors to earn their fresh start by complying with a three-year
payment plan imposed by the court.36 The amount of payment demanded of
debtors was subject to the all-but-unfettered discretion of the court, guided
only by a frightening suggestion that the payment obligation could be up to
70% of the debtor s net income. 37
Few debtors managed to clear the entry barrier to this new system,
though those who did so seem largely to have succeeded in obtaining relief.
It took seven years of operation for this new procedure to produce 100 cases
admitted to the three-year payment plan phase, though 484 debtors had
applied for such relief and only about 200 cases were fully administered
(leaving a significant and persistent backlog).38 By the end of 2016, the total
number of discharge applications over the ten-year life of the regime had
risen to 1,855, with administered cases still lagging far behind at 685, of
which 478 had been admitted to the payment plan phase.39 This methodical
approach to case evaluation was apparently fairly successful, as only a
handful of cases over the eleven-year life of this original procedure ended in
default or withdrawal, and most admitted cases seem to have concluded with
a granted discharge about three years later, suggesting that courts had
exercised their discretion in imposing relatively judicious payment
obligations.40
Digging a bit deeper reveals a stark local legal culture issue at the
admissions stage. The admissions figures just mentioned produce an
admissions rate of 70% of all administered cases from 2006 through 2016.

35. Id
Resurrection of
Personal Insolvencies in Slovakia? , EUROFENIX, Spring 2017, at 34.
36.
supra note 35, at 34.
37. Id.
38. These figures derive from annual bankruptcy case statistics published by the Slovak
Ministry of Justice. See Konkurzné konania na okresných súdoch SR, MINISTERSTVO
SPRAVODLIVOSTI SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY (Slovk.), http://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky
/Informacie/Statistika-konkurznych-konani-OS.aspx [https://perma.cc/5J5Q-772X] [hereinafter
Slovak Bankruptcy Statistics] (reporting discharge application and administration statistics in
Slovakia from 2006 through 2012).
39. See id. (reporting discharge application and administration statistics in Slovakia from 2006
through 2016).
40. See id. (compiling bankruptcy proceeding outcome statistics in Slovakia from 2006 through
2016).
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But in examining district-level rates among the eight districts adjudicating
these cases, stark differences emerge. In the last six years of the original
regime, the court in the capital region of Bratislava admitted 100% of
administered cases, with the high-volume courts in Banská Bystrica and
The district court in Tren ín, in contrast, admitted only
33% of administered cases during this period (fewer than 20% before
2015).41 The small number of cases makes these figures less compelling, but
the differing admissions practices of these decision makers seem to fairly
clearly reflect very different attitudes toward, most likely, quite similar
debtors. Payment-plan practices likely also differed dramatically. Over the
entire eleven-year period under the original law, only two debtors emerged
with a discharge from the process in
, compared with five in
Bratislava and thirty-eight in Banská Bystrica (percentages are difficult to
determine here, but judging by any perspective, the ratios of success vary
wildly across districts).42
The Slovak government set out in 2016 to rectify this sad situation and
align Slovak practice with regimes that are more accommodating to debtors.
The legislature quickly took up and adopted the Justice Ministry s bold
revision of the bankruptcy law in November 2016, effective March 1, 2017.43
Departing from the European standard and all but abandoning fear of abuse,
the new Slovak regime offers debtors a free choice between asset liquidation
and immediate discharge or a five-year payment plan,44 parallel to the U.S.
choice between chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Debtors must be
represented by the publicly supported Centre for Legal Aid,45 and the now
installments over three years) to debtors unable to pay the fee immediately. 46
To make liquidation an even more attractive option, the range of debtors
property exempt from liquidation has been expanded with a homestead
47

41. See id. (providing discharge application and administration statistics by district from 2011
through 2016).
42. See id. (reporting discharge statistics by district from 2006 through 2016).
43. See
supra note 35, at 34 (describing the implications of the amendment).
44.
zákonov [Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring and on Amendment and Supplementation of
Several Other Laws] (Slovk.),
https://www.noveaspi.sk/products/lawText/1/59304/1/2
[https://perma.cc/WKK2-D6D6] (current version).
45. Id. § 166k.
46. CENTRUM PRÁVNEJ POMOCI, OSOBNÝ BANKROT 4 5 (2017) (Slovk.),
http://www.centrumpravnejpomoci.sk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Bro%C5%BE%C3%BAraOB-02_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFR3-4WHV].
47.
supra note 44, § 167h(4). The Justice Ministry issued a press release on
the new law and homestead exemption. Dostupnejší osobný bankrot, MINISTERSTVO
SPRAVODLIVOSTI SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY (Mar. 1, 2017) (Slovk.), http://www.justice.gov.sk
/Stranky/aktualitadetail.aspx?announcementID=2179 [https://perma.cc/XK7U-3L7G].
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In stark contrast with recent U.S. practice, Slovak lawmakers embedded
in their new system a clear preference for quick liquidation-and-discharge
relief, actively discouraging debtors from pursuing the payment plan route.
For debtors who choose to preserve their nonexempt assets and propose a
payment plan, the reserved budget for family support must cover the debtor s
family s housing and basic needs (still undefined in the law48) and offer
creditors a minimum 30% dividend (and at least 10% more value than a
liquidation would produce).49 For debtors whose disposable income does not
appear sufficient to meet these thresholds, the statute directs the trustee to
recommend that the debtor file a petition for bankruptcy liquidation.50
By the end of November 2017, the Centre for Legal Aid had registered
nearly 63,000 consultations with debtors interested in the new discharge
procedure.51 Over 8,000 petitions were filed in the first nine months of
availability of the new processes, 7,800 seeking liquidation and discharge,
and slightly more than 200 proposing a five-year payment plan.52 The courts
quickly accelerated their formerly languid administration process, granting
admission to 6,454 bankruptcy cases and 117 payment plan cases.53 Of these,
about half of the bankruptcy cases have already closed with a discharge,
while a payment plan has been confirmed in forty cases.54 In the nine months
from March to November 2017, the number of petitions for bankruptcy
exceeded the entire number filed in the eleven-year period of the old law by
a factor of four. The number of cases admitted in the first nine months of the
new procedure was 13.5 times as large as the total number admitted over the
previous ten years, and 17 times as as many discharges have been granted.55
The new Slovak system is a unique example of the modern European retreat
from fear of abuse and embrace of standardized, low-burden personal
discharge.

48. See
New Personal Insolvency Regime in Slovakia, 0-1-CEE! CENT. EUR.
LEGAL NEWS & VIEWS BLOG (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.ceelegalblog.com/2016/12/857/
[https://perma.cc/7MQ7-98WR] (noting that debtor living expenses are to be determined by trustees
49.
supra note 44, § 168c(4) (5).
50. Id. § 168c(7).
51. Rok 2017 na ministerstve spravodlivosti, MINISTERSTVO SPRAVODLIVOSTI SLOVENSKEJ
REPUBLIKY (Dec. 19, 2017) (Slovk.), http://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/aktualitadetail.aspx
?announcementID=2285 [https://perma.cc/2YWG-NALA] [hereinafter 2017 at the Ministry of
Justice].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Slovak Bankruptcy Statistics, supra note 38 (reporting bankruptcy admission and
discharge statistics in Slovakia from 2006 through 2016); 2017 at the Ministry of Justice, supra note
51 (reporting bankruptcy admission and discharge statistics from March through November of
2017).
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Poland 2009–2015

A somewhat similar story played out in Poland, though over a shorter
period of time. Poland s first consumer discharge law was adopted much later
than the Slovak version, and it ran into serious trouble immediately. Effective
at the end of March 2009,56 the Polish Law on Bankruptcy and Rehabilitation
was supplemented to allow consumers to seek discharge relief, but, again,
fear of abuse compelled legislators to place two major obstacles in the way
of access to this relief. First, debtors had to establish that their insolvency
resulted from exceptional circumstances entirely beyond their control.57 As
if this were not sufficient to bar access to all but a small handful of applicants,
admission also required a demonstration of sufficient assets to cover the costs
of administration, which varied from case to case and were estimated at
,
,000.58
In the nearly four years from March 2009 through the end of 2012, just
over 2,160 consumer debtors applied for discharge relief under the new law,
but only sixty (2.8%) were admitted into the system.59 The Justice Ministry
was not pleased. The Ministry proposed a reform, expressing its feeling that
these statistics and legislative experiences of other countries show, the
current restrictive approach envisaged in Polish law should be liberalized. 60
A little over a year later, a bill was on the floor of the legislature with an
explanatory statement reminding lawmakers of the many benefits of
consumer discharge law, observing that the Polish approach had failed due
to the cost and qualification barriers noted above and aiming to reduce or
completely remove these barriers.61 The bill traveled through the legislative
process quickly, and legislators put fear of abuse behind them as they passed
the liberalizing amendments into law at the end of August 2014, effective
December 31, 2014.62 Meanwhile, statistics on the operation of the old law
came to an ignominious end, with a total of 2,735 applications submitted over
56.
Consumer Insolvency Proceedings in Poland 5 (Instytut
Allerhanda, Working Paper 12/2015, 2015).
57.
Consumer Bankruptcy in Poland, MONEY MATTERS,
no. 14, 2017, at 20, 20.
58.
supra note 57, at 20.
59. See Ewidencja spraw upad o ciowych (w tym upad o ci konsumenckiej “of”) za lata 2005 –
(Pol.), https://isws.ms.gov
2015, INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU S
.pl/pl/baza-statystyczna/opracowania-wieloletnie/download,2853,56.html
[https://perma.cc/GAN4-WSXM] (reporting bankruptcy applications and admissions in Poland
from 2009 through 2012).
S
,
REKOMENDACJE
Z
MINISTRA
60. MINISTERSTWO
S
. NOWELIZACJI P
I NAPRAWCZEGO 270 (2012)
(Pol.) (original in Polish).
61. O zmianie ustawy
ciowe i naprawcze oraz niekt rych innych ustaw [Bill
Amending the Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law] (2014 Nr 2265) (Pol.) (original in Polish).
62.
supra note 56, at 5.
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nearly six years and only 120 successfully admitted an ultimate aggregate
admission rate of just 4.4%.63
From 2015 forward, Polish debtors have been free to seek discharge
relief so long as they did not cause their insolvency intentionally or as a
result of gross negligence. 64 For debtors with limited assets, administration
costs are initially covered by the state treasury (and the costly formality of
publication of case information in newspapers was scrapped in favor of
electronic publication to reduce expense).65 After liquidation of the debtor s
assets, Polish practice still follows the European norm of imposing a payment
plan on debtors to earn their discharge, but both the term (up to three years,
down from five in the earlier law) and payment amount are still left to
unfettered court discretion.66 In a powerful move away from fear of abuse,
however, the law explicitly recognizes that many debtors will lack payment
capacity beyond meeting their basic needs, so it provides for an immediate
discharge if the court finds that this is clearly shown. 67 For cases where a
payment plan is imposed, it can be amended for improvements in the debtor s
payment capacity, but only for reasons other than an increase in
remuneration for work or services personally performed by the debtor. 68
This provides a creative incentive for debtors to maximize their productivity
immediately following insolvency proceedings.
As in Slovakia, Polish debtors eagerly accepted the invitation to this
newly liberalized relief. Already in the first year of the new Polish law, more
than 5,600 debtors applied and 2,153 were admitted nearly twenty times as
many admitted cases as in the previous six years combined.69 Those figures
nearly doubled again in 2016, with almost 8,700 applications and 4,447
admission orders, and the acceptance rate rose above 50% for the first time.70
Many applications are still being rejected, but largely for incorrect
completion of the forms,71 and the average four-month processing time for
cases suggests that the admission rate will rise as the crush of new cases
63. See INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU S
, supra note 59
(presenting applications and admission statistics from 2009 through 2014).
64. O zmianie ustawy
ciowe i naprawcze, ustawy o Krajowym Rejestrze
S dowym oraz ustawy o kosztach s dowych w sprawach cywilnych [Amendment to the Bankruptcy
and Reorganization Law] (2014 r. DZ. U. poz. 1306), Art. 491 4(1) (Pol.) [hereinafter Prawo
ciowe] (original in Polish).
supra note 56, at 10, 29.
65. Id., Art. 4917(1), Art. 49116
66.
supra note 64, Art. 49114, Art. 49115.
67. Id. at Art. 49116(1) (original in Polish).
68. Id. at 64, Art. 49119(3) (original in Polish).
, supra note 59
69. See INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU S
(providing applications and admission statistics from 2009 through 2016).
70. Id. Admissions levelled off in 2017 at just over 5,500, though with a sharp turn upward in
INFORMACJI
the last three months of the year. 2017 upad o konsumencka, CENTRALNY O
GOSPODARCZEJ, http://www.coig.com.pl/2017-upadlosc-konsumencka-lista_osob
.php [https://perma.cc/SR3D-WPAU].
, supra note 59.
71. INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU S
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makes its way through the procedure. Fear of abuse is in definite retreat in
Poland.
II.

Most Recent Developments: Less Discretion, Less Fear of Abuse

A.

Russia 2015–2017

Only two years old, the new Russian consumer bankruptcy system has
already encountered and addressed the same cost impediments that hindered
the operation of the Slovak and Polish systems. It also confronted an
unexpected form of resistance when lower courts creatively interpreted the
new law to prohibit use by most consumer debtors. Here again, in a decisive
rejection of fear of abuse, the Russian Supreme Court last year put the system
back on track to achieve its primarily rehabilitative purposes.
In the transition back to a market-based economic system following
decades of stagnation under Communism, Russia adopted a consumer
bankruptcy law in December 2014, with a delayed effective date of
October 1, 2015.72 This law carried few of the hallmarks of fear of abuse seen
elsewhere. Though it appears to follow European standards by requiring
debtors to relinquish both nonexempt asset value and some amount of future
income, the income expropriation period seems to last only six months, and
debtors are entitled to a nondiscretionary exemption of a statutorily
determined portion of their income.73 So far so good.
The ironic problem, as in Slovakia and Poland, seems to be money, as
debtors have struggled to afford the costs of the procedure. In the first year
of the law, of an estimated avalanche of 670,000 potential overindebted
applicants, only 33,000 debtors petitioned for relief, only 14,800 cases were
opened, and fewer than 500 made their way completely through the complex,
ten-month-long average procedure.74 Lawmakers first thought cost barriers
were keeping the sea of applicants back, so in November 2016 they reduced
the filing fee from 6,000 rubles to a nominal 300 rubles (from about $244 to
$12 at Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate (PPP)), effective January 1,
2017.75 But by the end of the second year of the new law s operation, the total

72. Jason J. Kilborn, Treating the New European Disease of Consumer Debt in a PostCommunist State: The Groundbreaking New Russian Personal Insolvency Law, 41 BROOK. J. INT L
L. 655, 686 (2016).
73. Id. at 698 700, 710 11.
74. Natali
Zhizn vza my, ROS. GAZ. (Nov. 7, 2016) (Russ.), https://rg.ru
/2016/11/07/sredi-rossijskih-grazhdan-okazalos-bankrotov-bolshe-chem-sredi-kompanij.html
[https://perma.cc/47DW-PL7X].
75.
Kakie vazhnye zakony vstupiat v silu s 2017 goda, ROS. GAZ. (Dec. 28, 2016)
(Russ.), https://rg.ru/2016/12/28/kakie-vazhnye-zakony-vstupiat-v-silu-s-2017
-goda.html [https://perma.cc/2YEA-JQTA].
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number of consumer cases commenced had little more than doubled to just
over 40,000.76
The reduction in filing fees was merely a drop in the bucket compared
to the real problem: the cost of the required financial administrator, set by
statute at 25,000 rubles (about $1,000 at PPP) but in reality often higher, and
other administrative expenses reportedly boost the total cost of a personal
bankruptcy filing to at least 100,000 rubles in Moscow ($4,000 PPP) and at
least 60,000 rubles in provincial regions (about $2,500 PPP).77 This is in
addition to the logistical challenge of filing a bankruptcy case in the often
distant commercial courts, only one of which is located in each subject
(governmental region) of Russia s expansive territory.78
Both the cost factor and another less obvious obstacle to relief were
revealed as serious doctrinal problems when one of the first cases under the
new law made its way to the Russian Supreme Court.79 Two months after the
effective date of the new law, the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Court in the remote
Western Siberian Tyumen Oblast opened a personal bankruptcy case only to
close it five months later on two grounds, both related to the absence of any
substantial asset value in the case.80 First, the court felt that the absence of
sufficient asset value to offer even a partial distribution to unsecured creditors
undermined the very purpose, in its view, of the bankruptcy law that is, to
offer proportionate satisfaction of creditors claims from the debtor s assets.81
Second, insufficient asset value to pay administrative costs constitutes a basis
for case closure under Article 57 of the Law on Insolvency, and the court
held that funds could not be advanced by a nondebtor to cover these costs.82
The Supreme Court struck back at these philosophical constraints on the
new law and dealt another blow to fear of abuse of consumer discharge.
Consumer bankruptcy has other purposes, the Court asserted, beyond
satisfying creditors. Access to legislatively prescribed relief cannot be
restricted simply on the basis that the debtor has no asset value to offer
creditors, and this cannot be equated to bad faith, more specific evidence

76.
ana Zamakhia, Dobrosovestnym grazhdanam predlozhili spisat dolgi, ROS. GAZ.
(Nov. 8, 2017) (Russ.), https://rg.ru/2017/11/08/dobrosovestnym-grazhdanam-predlozhili-spisatdolgi.html [https://perma.cc/LVG2-P67P].
77.
ana Zykova, Bol she ne dolzhen, ROS. GAZ. (Jan. 12, 2017) (Russ.),
https://rg.ru/2017/01/12/chislo-bankrotov-v-rossii-za-poslednie-3-mesiaca-vyroslo-na-27.html
[https://perma.cc/8RL9-VG29].
78. Kilborn, supra note 72, at 691 93.
79.
sii ot 23 avara 2017 [Decision of the
Russian Federation Supreme Court of Jan. 23, 2017], N. 304- S16-14541, Delo N. A7014095/2015. 2017 (Russ.).
80. Id. at 2 3.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id.
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of which is required to deny a discharge.83 And while debtors must, indeed,
somehow cover the administrative costs of the proceeding (which at the time
were much smaller than now, with only a 10,000 ruble fee for the financial
administrator), the Court pointed out that the law contained no provision
forbidding debtors from seeking help from third parties in covering these
fees.84
For debtors without generous friends, the law does indeed still require
full payment of administrative costs,85 which clearly remains a deterrent for
many debtors, as it was in Slovakia and Poland. Fortunately, the Ministry of
Economic Development has already proposed a simplification of the
procedure mainly exclusion of the costly financial administrator for cases
involving debtors with limited debts and assets (less than 900,000 rubles of
debt, about $37,000 at PPP, fewer than ten creditors, and income less than
the statutory minimum livable income).86 This further step away from fear of
abuse has been met with some resistance, so this will be a developing story
to watch in 2018 and beyond. Incidentally, lawmakers in neighboring
Ukraine have long agitated for a personal bankruptcy law as well, but to date,
they have not progressed beyond the stage of a draft bill, the most notable of
which has been pending for two years.87
B.

Austria 1995–2017

Perhaps the biggest change ushered in at the start of the new year is a
major withdrawal from fear of abuse at the culmination of a long-fought
battle in Austria. This is one of the small handful of consumer discharge
regimes that was already in operation beginning in 1995, before Jay wrote
his commentary, and it exemplifies the fear of abuse that he discerned in
Europe at the time. For over twenty years, the Austrian procedure imposed
three classic European hurdles to deter feared abuse by consumer debtors.
After decades of criticism by counseling centers and other observers,88 each

83. Id. at 3 (original in Russian).
84. Id. at 4.
85.
to
(Bankruptcy)], N 127-FZ. st. 57(1) (Russ.); see also Zykova, supra note 77 (noting that the
administrator can request case closure at any point if his fees and expenses are not paid by the
debtor).
86. Elena Berezina & Irina Zhandarova, Vernut vse, ROS. GAZ. (Mar. 13, 2017) (Russ.),
https://rg.ru/2017/03/13/grazhdanam-uprostiat-bankrotstva.html [https://perma.cc/ZV55-Z7HH];
Zykova, supra note 77.
87.
a My skovska a, Kak stat bankrotom: novy zakon mozhet pomoch yzbavyt sia ot
nevyplachennykh dolhov, KOMSOMOL SKA A PRAVDA V UKRAYNE (Nov. 15, 2017) (Ukr.), https://
kp.ua/print/economics/592146-kak-stat-bankrotom-novyi-zakon-mozhet-pomoch-yzbavytsia-otnevyplachennykh-dolhov [https://perma.cc/K28J-M8A5].
88. E.g., ASB SCHULDNERBERATUNGEN, SCHULDENREPORT 2016 14, 18 (2016) (Austria)
(calling for overdue reforms in Austrian insolvency law); Christiane Moser, Österreich: Reform des
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of these three obstacles was cleared away by near-unanimous legislative
reform effective November 1, 2017.89
First, like in Poland and Russia, the Austrian law originally required
debtors to pay at least the administrative costs of the proceeding. For those
unable to do so immediately upon applying for relief, such debtors had to
comply with another prerequisite: a mandatory attempt to work out their debt
problems privately through an out-of-court negotiation with creditors.90 This
negotiation was, unsurprisingly, very seldom successful, so in the reform it
was finally scrapped.91 Austria thus joins Sweden in having abandoned
mandatory debt counseling and negotiation as a prerequisite for formal
consumer insolvency relief.92
Second, like virtually every European consumer discharge regime, the
Austrian procedure requires both a liquidation of nonexempt assets and a
payment plan. Historically, most such plans were accepted by a vote of
creditors. Debtors had to propose to pay creditors an amount equal to five
years worth of their projected nonexempt income, and they could string out
those payments over as many as seven years to lighten the burden.93 Such a
plan is accepted by an affirmative vote of creditors who represent a majority
in number and amount of the claims of all voting creditors.94 While the great
majority (70%) of Austrian personal insolvency cases in the past have
concluded with such a court-mediated payment plan,95 low-income debtors
have been largely shut out of the process by the unique final minimumpayment hurdle discussed below. With the reform to allow low-income
debtors realistic access to relief, the necessity to propose a payment plan for
creditor voting has now been limited to debtors with substantial nonexempt

Privatkonkurses überfällig, DAS BUDGET, no. 78, 2016, at 6, 6 (Austria) (noting that Austria is
lagging behind in private bankruptcy reform).
89. Clemens Mitterlehner & Christa Kerschbaummayr, Reform of Personal Bankruptcy
Procedure in Austria, MONEY MATTERS, no. 15, 2017, at 8, 8.
90. KONKURSORDNUNGS-NOVELLE 1993 [BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENT OF 1993]
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 974/1993, § 183(2) (Austria), https://www.ris.bka
.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1993_974_0/1993_974_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B79C-HTTF].
91. Philipp Wetter, Austria: Major Changes in Personal Bankruptcy Law, SCHOENHERR
(July 4, 2017), https://www.schoenherr.eu/si/publications/publication-detail/austria-major
-changes-in-personal-bankruptcy-law/ [https://perma.cc/32US-3T5X].
92. Jason J. Kilborn, Out with the New, In with the Old: As Sweden Aggressively Streamlines
Its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers Fallen Off the Learning Curve? , 80 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 435, 458 (2006).
93. KONKURSORDNUNGS-NOVELLE 1993, supra note 90, §§ 193(1), 194(1).
94. INSOLVENZRECHTSÄNDERUNGSGESETZ 2010 [IR G 2010] [INSOLVENCY LAW
AMENDMENT 2010] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 29/2010, § 147(1) (Austria), https://www
.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2010_I_29/BGBLA_2010_I_29.html
[https://perma.cc/3JXX-4ALX].
95. GEORG KODEK, HANDBUCH PRIVATKONKURS: DIE SONDERBESTIMMUNGEN FUR DAS
INSOLVENZVERFAHREN NATÜRLICHER PERSONEN 384 tbl.C.3 (2015).
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income. That is, debtors with little or no nonexempt income can proceed
immediately to the final stage, a court-imposed earned discharge period.96
This earned discharge period and its culmination were the subjects of
the third and most substantial reform. Neither the length of this period nor
the amounts demanded from debtors were ever subject to any notable degree
of court discretion. Originally, debtors formally assigned to a trustee all of
their actual income in excess of an objective statutory existence minimum
amount for seven years.97 An additional requirement echoed the sentiment of
the Russian Tyumen Oblast Court discussed above regarding the purpose of
bankruptcy: at the conclusion of this seven-year period, Austrian debtors
received a discharge only if they had paid off administrative costs and
produced a dividend of 10% of unsecured creditors claims.98 Debtors who
missed this mark only slightly could hope for a hardship discharge at court
discretion, perhaps after an additional three-year period of toil and sacrifice,
but the discharge could be and sometimes was denied to debtors who failed
to produce a satisfactory dividend for creditors.99 Many more low-income
debtors were doubtless deterred from even attempting to obtain discharge
relief, knowing they likely could not cover costs and produce the minimum
10% dividend for creditors.100
As of November 1, 2017, in a tectonic shift from longtime fear to full
acceptance of consumer discharge, Austrian legislators scrapped the 10%
minimum dividend, softened the requirement to cover administrative costs,
and reduced the earned discharge period from seven to five years.101 At the
conclusion of the now five-year period, the court enters a discharge
regardless of whether the debtor has covered costs and produced a dividend
for creditors.102 Administrative costs that cannot be covered by debtors are
advanced from the state Treasury, to be collected from the proceeds of
liquidation of debtors nonexempt assets or collection of nonexempt
income.103 If the debtor s asset value and five years of nonexempt payments

96. INSOLVENZRECHTSÄNDERUNGSGESETZ 2017 [IR G 2017] [INSOLVENCY LAW
AMENDMENT 2017] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 122/2017, §§ 193(1), 194(1) (Austria),
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2017_I_122/BGBLA_2017_I_122.html
[https://perma.cc/LWF7-RPRE].
97. KONKURSORDNUNGS-NOVELLE 1993, supra note 90, § 199(2).
98. Id. §§ 194, 213.
99. Id.
100. See ASB SCHULDNERBERATUNGEN, supra note 88, at 14 15 (discussing the 10%
minimum); KODEK, supra note 95, at 165 202, 249 338.
101. INSOLVENZRECHTSÄNDERUNGSGESETZ 2017, supra note 96, §§ 199(2), 213(1).
102. Id. § 213(1).
103. INSOLVENZORDNUNG [INSOLVENCY CODE] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL]
no. 122/2017, as amended, § 184(1) (2) (Austria) https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe
?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10001736&FassungVom=2017-10-31
[https://perma.cc/WEG7-86U2].
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have not managed to cover administrative costs, the debtor remains liable to
cover those costs only if and when he is in a position to do so without
impairment of his [and his family s] necessary support. 104 Even this
obligation prescribes (i.e., is barred by a statutory limitations period) three
years after the conclusion of the proceedings.105 The Czech Republic now
stands alone in the European Union with a law that requires a minimum
dividend to unsecured creditors (30%) for consumer debtors to earn their
discharge.106 Perhaps not enough time has passed for fear of abuse to abate
since the Czech consumer discharge became available in 2008, but one hopes
the Czech Republic will follow Austria s example in far less than the twentytwo years it took for Austria to do so.
C.

Croatia 2016, Romania 2018
The two newest consumer discharge procedures in Europe reveal a bit
of unfortunate backpedaling toward fear of abuse, though there is good
reason to expect that discretion will be exercised sparingly and within
relatively narrow boundaries in these two latecomer systems. Both will be
unfolding stories to watch in the years to come.
1. Croatia.—Croatia was the most recent European Union Member
State to adopt a consumer bankruptcy procedure, effective January 1, 2016.107
It immediately took two steps backward toward fear of abuse by adopting the
prereform Austrian procedure, minus the minimum dividend to creditors. Not
learning from the repeated failures of these processes in neighboring regions,
Croatian legislators reimposed two futile access restrictions just abandoned
by Austria, along with what seems like a fairly menacing multiyear payment
obligation.
First, Croatian debtors can gain entry to the in-court discharge procedure
only after engaging a counseling center to propose an out-of-court settlement
plan to creditors.108 When the counseling center inevitably concludes that this
effort is doomed to failure, it issues a certificate to that effect, which the
debtor must present within three months with a petition for bankruptcy

104. Id. § 184(3).
105. Id.
106. KILBORN, supra note 29, at 30, 37.
107. Zakon o ste aju potroša a [Law on Consumer Bankruptcy], NN 100/2015 (1936) (Croat.);
Emir Bahtijarevic & Ema Mendusic Skugor, New Insolvency Legislation to Thoroughly Change
Bankruptcy Procedures in Croatia, CEE LEGAL MATTERS, Feb. 2016, at 88, 88.
& MARKO KRUC, SCHONHERR, CROATIA: CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
108. OZREN I
ACT INTRODUCES CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY INTO THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2016), https://www
.schoenherr.eu/uploads/tx_news/Croatia_Consumer_Bankruptcy_final_pdf3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W45U-U3KL].
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relief.109 The state agency that oversees these counselors, the Financial
Agency (FINA), has released statistical data on the first two years of the new
Croatian procedure indicating that a total of 1,159 debtors have engaged
counseling centers to initiate the out-of-court process.110 These debtors had
an average of only six creditors and mostly quite small debts, but in only one
case were all creditors somehow convinced to sign onto the debtor s
proposed settlement plan (and in only sixteen cases was an agreement
reached even with some of the debtor s creditors).111 Certificates of failure
had thus been issued to 795 debtors, with the same result most likely awaiting
most or all of the remaining applicants.112
Second, to gain access to the formal discharge procedure, debtors must
again present a settlement plan to creditors in an in-court process. Only after
that effort inevitably fails again, a liquidation of the debtor s nonexempt
assets ensues, and like in Austria, Croatian debtors are relegated to an
additional behaviour checking period of between one and five years.113
While the law appears to leave the precise duration of this period to judicial
discretion, it seems likely that courts will in most cases choose the maximum
five-year term. This was the result in the very first personal bankruptcy case
in Croatia, where a fifty-one-year-old former entrepreneur with no assets and
only pension income was assigned a five-year term from which she filed an
appeal for a reduction to a year and a half.114 During this period, debtors are
subject to a nondiscretionary requirement of turnover of all income above the
statutory exemption. The Croatian statutory minimum income figures seem
far less livable than their Austrian equivalents, with one Croatian journalist
characterizing them as neoliberal euthanasia. 115 This likely explains why
only a fraction of the expected 10,000 20,000 potential debtors have applied
for relief.116 In this respect, the newest European consumer discharge system
109. Id.
110. FINANCIJSKA AGENCIJA (FINA), PREGLED ZBIRNIH PODATAKA IZ SUSTAVA PROVEDBE
S
RAZDOBLJE OD 1.1.2016. DO 03.04.2018. GODINE 2 (2018) (Croat.), http://
www.fina.hr/lgs.axd?t=16&id=19566 [https://perma.cc/J4YR-U2LM].
111. Id. at 2, 7.
112. Id. at 7.
& KRUC, supra note 108.
113. I
114. See
Prva u osobni bankrot otišla propala poduzetnica iz Krapine,
(Oct. 17, 2016) (Croat.), https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/prva-u-osobni-bankrot
V
-otisla-propala-poduzetnica-iz-krapine-1121543 [https://perma.cc/7FKP-QUE9] (reporting the
115. See Leo Buljan, Možete li preživjeti s 800 kuna mjese no? Ako potpišete osobni ste aj,
bolje da nau ite!, PORTAL DNEVNO (June 26, 2014) (Croat.), http://www.dnevno.hr/novac/mozeteli-prezivjeti-s-800-kuna-mjesecno-ako-potpisete-osobni-stecaj-bolje-da-naucite-126174/
[https://perma.cc/APA5-RYJR] (original in Croatian) (citing minimum income figures of $133 per
month for the debtor, $80 for an adult family member, and $53 for each child (not at PPP)).
& KRUC, supra
116. See I
10,000 and 20,000 of the indebte
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may reveal something of a resurgence of fear of abuse, though not in the guise
of judicial discretion.
2. Romania.—Meanwhile, the latest European consumer discharge system to actually begin operations has just come online in Romania as of January 1, 2018. While the Romanian legislature unanimously adopted its Law
no. 151/2015 on the insolvency procedure of natural persons in June
2015,117 the government pushed back the effective date several times.118 This
delay was attributable in part to government efforts to constrain discretion in
evaluating debtors capacities to support settlement plans with creditors and
to endure a multiyear earned discharge period.
The Romanian law adopts the French approach119 of routing debtors
through standing insolvency commissions, which evaluate whether cases
should be directed to a negotiation with creditors and a potential five-year
payment plan, or, for debtors whose financial situation is irremediably
compromised, to a liquidation-and-discharge procedure.120 In performing
the sensitive and critical evaluation of debtors payment capacities that
determines which path is pursued, the insolvency commissions are not left to
their own devices; rather, the Ministry of Justice directed the chair of the
central insolvency commission to publish detailed criteria for determining a
reasonable standard of living for debtors in insolvency proceedings. These
criteria must be based on a list of national economic benchmarks, including
cost-of-living indices, various family and household compositions, and
transportation and housing guidelines.121 The publication of these criteria
seems to have been delayed as of this writing, but the effort to constrain
discretion and contain fear of abuse is manifest.
If Romanian institutions embrace the French approach to the notion of
irremediably compromised debtors (as seems highly likely), many if not
most debtors will be routed to an immediate liquidation-and-discharge

117.
ul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr.
464/26.06.2015 (Rom.); Mihaela Condrache & Liviana Andreea Nimine , Personal Bankruptcy and
the Romanian Realities, STUD. & SCI. RES., no. 22, 2015, at 7, 8.
118. See, e.g.,
for the extension of the entry into force of Law no. 151/2015 on insolvency procedure of natural
persons]
I, nr. 962/24.12.2015 (Rom.).
commission119. See KILBORN, supra note 29, at 34
120. Condrache & Nimine , supra note 117, at 9 11.
121.
Norms for the Application of Law on the Insolvency o
Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 436/13.06.2017, art. 2 (Rom.).

2018]

Fear of Abuse in Consumer Bankruptcy

1347

procedure.122 The insolvency commissions can send particularly low-income,
elderly debtors to simplified proceedings, which require a simple observation
period of three years before a final discharge is granted.123 For all others, the
asset liquidation is followed by a payment period, during which a courtdetermined proportion of the debtor s income in excess of reasonable living
expenses must be paid to creditors.124 This proportion is determined in
accordance with the published budgetary guidelines for a reasonable
standard of living. 125 The duration of the payment period is determined by
the percentage of debts paid off as little as one year if 50% of debts are paid
within that time but given the finances of most debtors, the most common
objectively determined term will be five years for debtors unable to produce
at least a 40% dividend.126 These nondiscretionary and sensitive terms for
earning discharge relief reflect further relaxation of fear of abuse at the most
recent launch of a consumer insolvency system.
III. Consumer Discharge-in-Waiting: Fear of Abuse Manifest in Laws in
Development
In countries that have not by this point followed the personal bankruptcy
trend sweeping across Europe, one would expect to find a great deal of
resistance to the notion of offering such relief. A resurgence of fear of abuse
is fairly obvious in the last European straggler, Bulgaria, where proposed
bills reflect this fear in objective, but all-but-insurmountable, barriers to
relief. Beyond Europe, advanced-stage proposals developing in China and
Saudi Arabia confirm that newcomers to personal discharge approach the
policy conversation with great hesitancy.
A.

Bulgaria
In 2000, household debt was hardly a blip on the social policy radar
screen in Bulgaria. By 2008, household debt had exploded and while still not
reaching the worrying levels of some other European states, had risen to and
remained at a level that caught the attention of policymakers. 127 Concerned
122. See KILBORN, supra note 29, at 34 35 (describing the increasing number of cases
admin
Determinants of Failure . . . and Success in
Personal Debt Mediation, TRANSNAT L DISP. MGMT. Nov. 2017 at 1, 11 12 (discussing the growth
123.

supra note 117, arts. 65

70.
124. Id. art. 57(1)(b).
125. Id. art. 3(25) (original in Romanian).
126. See id. art. 72 (prescribing the procedure
payment period).
127. See Miroslav Nikolov, Households Indebtedness: State-of-the-Art, MONEY MATTERS,
no. 14, 2017, at 7, 8 fig.3 (illustrating the sizeab
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Bulgarian legislators finally introduced a bill in February 2015 to provide
protection against overindebtedness of natural persons in the form of a
cost-free, European-style procedure of asset liquidation followed by a threeyear earned discharge period of relinquishment of nonexempt income.128 The
explanatory note to the bill commented that [t]he public interest requires
eternal debtors to be given an opportunity to engage anew in socially
beneficial activity, consistent with European practice.129
This controversial bill made no progress before another was introduced
on July 21, 2017. The tone and approach of this new bill are quite different
from its predecessor s: debtors are deemed overindebted and allowed access
to relief only if they have worked consistently during three of the preceding
five years, their debts do not exceed 150,000 Bulgarian levs (about $95,000),
and they nonetheless appear unable to pay their debts with ten years of
expected income.130 In such cases, the earned discharge period would be ten
years on minimum income.131 Moreover, during this ten-year period, debtors
are prohibited from entrepreneurial activity as members or directors of
companies.132 Excluding retired people and long-term unemployed debtors
and calling on ten years of earning capacity is sure to produce a remedy for
very few maladies. One suspects Bulgaria is still some distance from a
consumer discharge law of any kind, let alone an effective one. One can just
picture the fear in legislators eyes!
B.

China

A most exciting recent development in China comes not from a central
government project, but from a controlled provincial experiment. While
China is in principle a highly centralized state, central authorities often afford
significant autonomy to regional governments to pursue large-scale trial runs
of new policies. Nowhere is this trend more powerful and more obvious than
in the special economic zones developed during the period of reform and
opening initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979.133 Deng s famous southern

2000 and 2008); Bulgaria Household Debt 2000–2016, CEIC, https://www.ceicdata.com/en
/indicator/bulgaria/household-debt [https://perma.cc/STW7-L7ZN] (reporting that
128.
sa [Draft, Law of
Protection Against Overindebtedness of Natural Persons], 554-01-30 ot 12/02/2015, arts. 3(2), 6,
16, 26 (Bulg.).
129. Id., Notes at 12 (original in Bulgarian).
130. Bill,
sa [Bill, Law of Protection
Against Overindebtedness of Natural Persons], 754-01-46 ot 24/07/2017, arts. 4(1), 5 (Bulg.).
131. Id. art. 22(1), 30.
132. Id. art. 31.
133. ARTHUR R. KROEBER, CHINA S ECONOMY: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 5 (2016).

2018]

Fear of Abuse in Consumer Bankruptcy

1349

tour in 1992 took him to one of the most prominent of these zones,
Shenzhen, just to the north of Hong Kong.134
This hotbed of economic development and local initiative appears to be
the likely future birthplace of personal bankruptcy law in China. In June
2014, a subgroup of the Shenzhen Bar Association began developing a
personal bankruptcy bill for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.135 A draft
law emerged by September 2015, with some unique and intriguing provisions
that suggest Shenzhen authorities are stepping lightly into this new legal
terrain.136
A preliminary review of the proposed law, working from this author s
rather rudimentary foundation in Chinese, reveals what seem to be fairly
rigorous and restrictive requirements for accessing the procedure and
obtaining relief. To access the personal liquidation process, debtors must
submit evidence of five years of income and expenditures (which presumably
indicate their payment ability and substantiate their claimed inability to clear
their debts timely), and their current standard of living must not exceed a
level corresponding to the local minimum wage.137 The draft law seems to
require the debtor to pay creditors the value of any nonexempt property
including disposable income the debtor reasonably anticipates receiving
over the next two years, which must in any case suffice immediately to cover
administrative costs.138
The discharge provision is a bit puzzling, but it seems to require a
minimum distribution to creditors of at least the amount distributed to them
by the debtor during the two-year period preceding the debtor s filing an
application for liquidation; otherwise, a discharge is conferred only by the
(extremely unlikely) unanimous vote of the creditors committee.139 This

134. Id. at 7.
135. SHENZHEN JINGJI TEQU GEREN POCHAN TIAOLI CAO AN JIANYI GAO FU LIYOU (
) [SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PERSONAL
BANKRUPTCY REGULATION DRAFT PROPOSAL WITH ACCOMPANYING REASONING] (Lu Lin
(
), ed., 2016) (China) [hereinafter Shenzhen Draft Bankruptcy Proposal]; see also “Shenzhen
Jingji Tequ Geren Pochan Tiaolì” Dashiji (
) [“Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone Personal Bankruptcy Ordinance” Retrospective], JIANGSU HUIJIN BANKR.
LIQUIDATION FIRM LTD. (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.js-hj.com/content/?190.html
[https://perma.cc/MAC3-AMC7] [hereinafter JIANGSU HUIJIN] (China) (providing a timeline of the
development of the Shenzhen bankruptcy proposal).
136. JIANGSU HUIJIN, supra note 135.
137. Shenzhen Draft Bankruptcy Proposal, supra note 135, arts. 95, 103.
138. Id. arts. 111, 113 16, 120.
139. Id. arts. 158 59. This unique discharge provision seems to be based on the discharge
provision of the Taiwan Consumer Insolvency Act of 2008. Xiaofeizhe Zhaiwu Qingli Tiaoli
(
) [Consumer Debt Clean-Up Regulation] (amended Dec. 26, 2010), art. 133
(Taiwan, officially Republic of China), https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawParaDeatil.aspx
?Pcode=B0010042&LCNOS=++80+++&LCC=2 [https://perma.cc/X5FR-ZEW9].
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provision could spell trouble for any potential discharge procedure, and it
suggests a deep fear of abuse by opportunistic debtors. Indeed, since 2013,
the current nationwide approach to defaulting debtors in China has been a
Supreme Court blacklist banning some debtors from using such luxuries as
airplane and high-speed-train travel and hotels.140 Time will tell whether the
Shenzhen draft or something like it becomes law and, if so, how it is applied
by Chinese courts who seem to be both wholly unaccustomed to and quite
skeptical of the concept of relief for defaulting debtors.
C.

Saudi Arabia
The Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry delivered a bombshell
when in April 2015 it released a policy paper on an initiative to revamp the
Kingdom s insolvency law.141 That paper projected that a new procedure
would encompass all private individuals, including ordinary consumers, and
would offer an automatic discharge of unpaid liabilities following a
liquidation and waiting period of twelve months.142 Another comment
expectedly but ominously noted that Shari a compliance would be an
important element when choosing public policies and the underlying
rules. 143 This is ominous because no school of Islamic Law (shari ah)
seemed to support or even accept the notion of discharging debts without the
consent of creditors.144 An imprint of the name of a Western law firm
(Clifford Chance) on every page of the English portion of the policy paper
offered reason for hope, however, so the announcement of a potential Islamic
discharge was both confusing and exciting.
As it turned out, the Western law firm had apparently not sufficiently
appreciated the implications of shari ah compliance. The ultimate draft law
released in September 2016 indeed adhered to Islamic Law and did not offer
a nonconsensual discharge.145 The explanatory note to the new draft makes
140. See Yongxi Chen & Anne Sy Cheung, The Transparent Self Under Big Data Profiling:
Privacy and Chinese Legislation on the Social Credit System, 12 J. COMP. L., no. 2, 2017, at 356,
362, 370 (describing travel restrictions on judgment defaulters and public disclosures of public
credit information); Yuan Yang, China Penalizes 6.7m Debtors with Travel Ban, FIN. TIMES
(Feb.
...
f350-11e6-8758-6876151821a6 [https://perma.cc/FUF3-AQSU].
141. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA INSOLVENCY LAW
PROJECT, POLICY PAPER (2016) (Saudi Arabia), http://mci.gov.sa/LawsRegulations/Projects/Pages
/ippd.aspx#1 [https://perma.cc/BV7Y-PQGH].
142. Id. §§ 4.1 4.5.
143. Id. § 1.2(b)(iii).
144. Abed Awad & Robert E. Michael, Iflas and Chapter 11: Classical Islamic Law and
Modern Bankruptcy, 44 INT L LAWYER 975, 981, 997, 999 (2010); Jason J. Kilborn, Foundations
of Forgiveness in Islamic Bankruptcy Law: Sources, Methodology, Diversity, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J.
323, 347 (2011).
-Iflaas [Draft of the System of
145. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS.
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no mention of the Western concept. The provisions on liquidation do apply
to ordinary individuals, but the rehabilitation article is quite clear that
following a liquidation of nonexempt assets, the debtor is not discharged
from his liability for remaining debt except for under a special or general
discharge from creditors. 146 In other words, perfectly consistent with Islamic
Law, the new Saudi bankruptcy law offers individual debtors a discharge
only with the consent of creditors, which one suspects is unlikely to be
forthcoming. The current draft is reportedly on its way to becoming law in
early 2018,147 leaving Saudi Arabia without consumer discharge. While
adherence to Islamic Law may not be fairly equated with fear of abuse, there
is a congruent reticence here to allow debtors to evade their obligations over
creditor opposition a reticence that appears likely to persist indefinitely in
the Kingdom.148
Conclusion
Virtually none of the developments described here would have a
counterpart in U.S. experience. Even the advent of the infamous means test
for constraining access to quick chapter 7 relief is of a very different nature
than the aggressive constraints on consumer discharge access witnessed in
Europe over the past twenty years. Following these comparative
developments (in English) has allowed policymakers and academics
worldwide to explore more deeply and in greater detail the fear of abuse that
Jay observed in the United States and Europe in the late 1990s, along with its
gradual but definite abatement in recent years. Comparative analysis has
greatly enriched the conversation about the proper balance of relief,
restriction, and responsibility with the rich harvest of new evidence that
Jay predicted. I am thrilled to have been part of that harvest and to say, once
again, thanks, Jay!

Bankruptcy] (2016) (Saudi Arabia), http://mci.gov.sa/MediaCenter/elan/Documents/01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9E8P-KWSR].
146. Id. art. 160.
147. Saudi Arabia Advisory Council Approves Draft Bankruptcy Law, REUTERS (Dec. 13,
2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-bankruptcy/update-1-saudi-arabia-advisory-council
-approves-draft-bankruptcy-law-idUSL8N1OD2IP [https://perma.cc/YF5A-8PYH].
148. The same is true elsewhere in the region, as the new United Arab Emirates bankruptcy law
does not apply to nonmerchants at all, leaving overindebted consumers, particularly those who write
NSF checks, still subject to arrest and imprisonment. See
-qanun al-aitihadaa raqm
(9) lisanat 2016 [Bankruptcy Law] (Official Gazette 29 Sept. 2016, effective 29 Dec. 2016)
(U.A.E.), https://www.mof.gov.ae/En/Lawsandpolitics/govlaws/pages/federalbankruptcy
.aspx [https://perma.cc/M4KQ-A5DQ]; Issac John, Why UAE’s New Bankruptcy Law Is a Boon for
Business, KHALEEJ TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.khaleejtimes.com/business/economy/uae
-bankruptcy-law-boom-bust-bonanza [https://perma.cc/N64T-T98S].

